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METHODS 
 
The legal analysis has been conducted following these phases: 
a) Collection of the existing legal texts as regards nuclear proliferation; 
b) Systematization according to their belonging to international or regional law; 
c) Legal analysis of the texts with a specific focus on safeguards provisions; and 
d) Comparison between texts; and 
e) Drawing of conclusions. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nuclear proliferation poses a severe threat to the international community, and the role of 
the law in this area is crucial. 
The notion of ‘nuclear non-proliferation’ is twofold:  
(a) disarm or vertical non-proliferation: measures for reduction of the number of existing 
arsenals; 
(b) horizontal non-proliferation: containment of the number of States and no State 
entities that do not have but are acquiring nuclear weapons, or developing the 
capability and materials for producing them (Sidel and Levy 2007). 
Different sources of the law exist at the international and regional level for addressing the 
issue.  
For the implementation of the principles and obligations embedded in the agreements, it is 






Safeguards provisions are established at the international and regional level. Thus, the aim of 
this study to analyse, critically and comparatively, the different safeguards systems  that have 
been legally adopted at the international and regional level so far. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIONAL LAW 
HORIZONTAL/ 
VERTICAL PROLIFERATION 
Treaty of Non Proliferation  of 
Nuclear Weapons 
-bilateral or multilateral 
agreements that ban 
weapons of mass destruction 
in certain areas (Nuclear Free 
Weapons Zones Treaties) 
- Limited Test Ban Treaty 
- Seabed Treaty 
- Antarctic Treaty 
- Outer Space Treaty 
- Moon Agreement 
c) Legal analysis of the texts with a specific focus on safeguards provisions 
 
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 
IAEA Safeguards System 
 
The NTP is the result of a ‘bargain’ among Nuclear Weapon States (that agree to pursue negotiations 
on nuclear disarmament) and  Non-Nuclear Weapon States (that undertake not to build or acquire 
nuclear weapons). 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been assigned the role of the nuclear ‘watchdog’ 
for the NPT. The sources for such safeguards system are: 
- IAEA Statute; 
- Comprehensive State Agreements (CSAs); 
- Additional Protocols; and 
- Integrate Safeguards System. 
• IAEA Statute (Art. XII): the IAEA checks specialized equipment, inventories and facilities, requires 
the maintenance of records from States, and asks for reports.  
• Comprehensive State Agreement: compulsory agreement between the States and the IAEA, on the 
basis of which the IAEA exercises its powers of verification upon ‘declared’ activities only;  
•Additional Protocols (1997): not compulsorily, the States can adopt this protocol that allows the 
IAEA to verify not only that State declarations of nuclear material subject to safeguards are ‘correct’, 
but that they are also ‘complete’. So, the IAEA could exercise its powers even upon undeclared 
activities, thus considering the State ‘ as a whole’.   
• Integrated Safeguards system (2002): it is the integration of Additional Protocols and the revision of 
the existing safeguard system with additional measures. It has enhanced the IAEA’s verification 
through the increase of unannounced inspections, and the use of remote sensing devices and 
automated systems for data evaluation. 
 
2. REGIONAL LAW: SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS WITHIN THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE-ZONE TREATIES 
(NWFZs) 
NWFZ treaties constitute a regional system for the establishment of norms of nonproliferation in 
certain areas. 
 
 The Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ): Semipalatinsk Treaty 
The safeguard system is entirely assigned to the IAEA (art. 8).   
The review of compliance with the Treaty is done through annual Consultative Meetings (art. 10). 
There is not specific body to oversee implementation and verification of the treaty. 
 
 TheTreaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean: Tlatelolco 
Treaty  
The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) is 
an intergovernmental agency (art. 7), created to ensure that the obligations under Tlatelolco treaty 
are respected; convoke periodic meetings; supervise the respect of the Control System. OPANAL 
recognizes the IAEA as the only Agency capable of carrying on inspections. 
 The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty: Pelindaba Treaty   
The African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE, Annex III) monitors the compliance by the 
State Parties with their non-proliferation obligations; ensures nuclear and radiation safety and 
security; increases partnership and technical cooperation; and promotes peaceful use of 
nuclear science and technology. AFCONE can request a special inspection to the IAEA, and send 
some members of its team to be part of the group of inspectors. 
 
 The Treaty on the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SPNWFZ): Raratonga Treaty  
The treaty requires all parties to apply IAEA safeguards. There is a Consultative Committee of 
the Parties (Annex III), which is informed by the Director of South Pacific Bureau of Economic 
Co-operation (SPEC) about cases of non compliance and it can also conduct special inspections. 
The inspectors’ conclusions  will be reported to the South Pacific Forum.  
 
 The Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone: Bangkok Treaty   
The treaty requires all parties to apply IAEA safeguards, and it has established a Commission for 
the Southeast Asia NWFZ (art. 8) to oversee the implementation of this treaty. The Commission 
takes measures for coping with the situation, and it can refer the issue to the IAEA. 
 
3. OTHER DENUCLEARIZATION TREATIES 
The Limited Test Ban Treaty  
It refers to denuclearization of atmosphere, outer space, under water, or any other 
environment. It does not contain any verification method. Each party may ensure verification 
though its national technical means. 
 
The Seabed Treaty 
It is aimed at banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor beyond a 12-
mile (22.2 km) coastal zone.  
It provides that each State Party shall verify the compliance (Article III). In case of doubt, 
inspections are conduced by States in cooperation. If doubts remain, the issue can be brought 
to the Security Council. 
 
 Antarctic Treaty 
The Antarctic is used for peaceful purposes only. Each Party can designate national inspectors, 
and has the duty to inform in advance of all expeditions, stations, military personnel and 
equipment sent to Antarctica. 
 
 Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement 
It prohibits nuclear weapons in orbit on the Earth or on the Moon or on any other celestial 
body. In the hypothesis of visit, the States shall give notice of the visit and provide 
precautions for safety reasons.  
 
4. OTHER REGIONAL BODIES 
 EURATOM  
It regulates nuclear energy in the EU. There is not a specific body for compliance, but the 
European Commission has three main powers: 
-Inspections to nuclear operators working in the Member States. If there is opposition to the 
inspection, the President of the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) has three days for deciding on the 
issue and ordering the compulsory inspection (art. 81); 
- sanctions upon nuclear operators: a warning, the withdrawal of financial benefits, the total or 
partial withdrawal of source materials or special fissile materials (art. 83); 
- directives to States as well, and if the State does not comply, the matter is referred to the ECJ 
(art. 82). 
The nuclear operators have to declare their installations (art. 78) and keep the records of their 
activities (art. 79).  
EURATOM and the IAEA has signed an agreement for cooperation (1973). 
 
 The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABAAC) 
It has to administer and apply the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (SCCC) to all nuclear materials in the activities of Brazil and Argentina. ABAAC and the 
IAEA shall conduct independent but also mutual and joint inspections, and cooperate in the 
safeguards purposes (since 1994). IAEA has been authorised to apply full safeguards in 
Argentina and Brazil. If a country is found to be in non compliance, the IAEA refers the case to 
the UNSC.  
DISCUSSIONS  
 
d) Comparison between texts 
- The IAEA is the central system of safeguards at international level, and it has proved to be 
quite effective through the years; 
-Regional systems are equally important to implement IAEA; 
-NWFZ treaties both contain norms about verification, and create specific regional authorities 
to complement the IAEA (except Semipalatinsk Treaty); 
- Denuclearization Treaties contain norms about verification and compliance, but they rely on 
the intervention of States for verification, or entrust only the IAEA for verification purposes; 
- other bodies at the regional level conduct their own inspections, but they also cooperate  with 
the IAEA through specific agreements. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
e) Drawing of conclusions 
The architecture of nuclear non-proliferation entails different agreements, bodies, agencies 
and norms. For an effective non proliferation, the best option is to enforce collaboration 
between the different levels, and conceive them as complementary. 
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